Abstract:

This study examines the process of political selection following regime change, focusing on the transition from the Ming to the Qing dynasty in China. Using a dataset of 4,537 Ming-era Jinshi degree holders, the research explores how the Qing selectively recruited former officials to consolidate power. The findings reveal that senior officials were more likely to be selected to serve the Qing despite facing high moral costs and limited career returns. This pattern was driven by two key mechanisms: legitimacy through elite endorsement, where the Qing sought respected figures to signal stability, and social networks and influence, leveraging the connections of senior officials to encourage broader compliance. Additionally, the Qing employed recruitment through the imperial examination system to integrate new loyalists while minimizing reliance on lower-tier Ming officials. The study contributes to broader discussions on regime consolidation, state-building, and political transitions in autocratic contexts by highlighting strategic elite co-optation as a tool for governance stabilization.