Title: When Patronage Sustains Merit: Factionalism, Personalistic Rule, and Political Selection in China

Speaker: Jianzi He

Discussant: Andrew MacDonald

Date: Wednesday, Feb 25th

Time: 11am – 12pm

Location: IB 1050

Zoom: 755 808 3289

Password: 1050

Abstract:

Departing from the conventional meritocracy-patronage dichotomy, I argue that factionalism based on patronage is more likely to sustain, rather than hinder, merit-based political selection in non-electoral settings. By contrast, efforts to suppress factionalism undermine the institutional foundations of meritocracy. I evaluate this argument in the context of China. Drawing on a novel dataset that traces the career trajectories of nearly all county- and prefectural-level Party leaders since 2000, I show that both patronage ties and economic performance lose explanatory power on local promotion after 2014, despite being salient in earlier periods. I rule out the possibility that economic growth has become less important in the central government’s agenda or that anti-corruption campaigns systematically target competent officials. Instead, additional evidence suggests that, as the system transitions toward personalistic rule, responsiveness to signals from the top leadership increasingly outweighs performance in local governance. 

Speaker bio:

Jianzi He studies the political economy of development, state capacity, and local governance. At the broadest level, his research contributes to understanding how states in the Global South, particularly China, develop and adapt in an era of shifting global power. His previous research appeared in journals such as Urban Affairs Review, Journal of Contemporary China, and Economic History of Development Regions. Currently, He is pursuing several research projects that investigate recent transformations in China’s political economy, including local officials’ incentives, intergovernmental relations, and the growing emphasis on industrial policy and economic security.